Nltest and net group were utilized to look for sensitive groups such as Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins. Process injection into explorer. The threat actors proceeded to install remote management tools such as Atera Agent and Splashtop. In this intrusion, we observed usage of gmail[.
On the sixth day of the intrusion, the beachhead host saw new discovery activity with a quick nltest followed by the PowerView script Invoke-ShareFinder. On the following day, the seventh day of the intrusion, the threat actors made their next move. On that day, a new Cobalt Strike server was observed, in fact over the course of the intrusion, four different Cobalt Strike servers were used.
After getting a foothold on the domain controller, we saw more process injection followed by the same pattern of installing Atera for additional persistent access. From the domain controller, the threat actors proceeded with more discovery tasks including AdFind and Invoke-ShareFinder again. After this, the threat actors went quiet. On day nine of the intrusion, the next Cobalt Strike server, which would ultimately be used until the end of the intrusion, was observed for the first time.
On the tenth day, little activity was observed but the threat actors connected to the beachhead host via the Atera agent and executed another Cobalt Strike DLL. A little discovery check-in was observed on the 14th day, but little else. On the 19th day, the threat actors moved towards their final objectives. They reviewed the directory structure of several hosts including domain controllers and backup servers.
They then dropped their final ransomware payload on the beachhead host and attempted to execute it using a batch file named backup. However, they found that their execution failed. While these exploits appear to have failed the threat actors found their previously captured domain admin credentials and launched two new Cobalt Strike beacons on the domain controllers.
Finally, twenty minutes after accessing the domain controllers, the threat actors dropped the ransomware DLL and the batch script and executed it from the domain controller. This time the execution worked as intended and resulted in domain wide ransomware. More information on this service and others can be found here. We also have artifacts and IOCs available from this case such as pcaps, memory captures, files, event logs including Sysmon, Kape packages, and more, under our Security Researcher and Organization services.
Report lead: 0xtornado. These initial access campaigns reportedly utilize contact forms to send malicious emails to intended targets. The emails contain a link to a legitimate storage service like those offered by Google and Microsoft. Below is a configuration extraction of that initial IcedID malware from an automated sandbox analysis of the sample :. The graph below shows detailed actions performed through IcedID, including reconnaissance and Cobalt Strike beacons drops:.
Only one scheduled task was created during this intrusion. The installation of those two packages reveals two emails potentially belonging to the ransomware operators or affiliates:. At one point in the intrusion the threat actors utilized Atera to download and launch a new Cobalt Strike beacon on one of the hosts they had installed the agent on.
The query status indicates that this does not exist. The exploitation involves invoking lookups to ensure that the new accounts were successful, explaining why failed DNS requests were observed. A number of process injections were seen during this intrusion. In our case, the access to LSASS process allowed the threat actors to compromise a domain admin account, which was then used to move laterally and deploy ransomware.
Multiple discovery techniques were observed throughout the case. The initial discovery techniques were conducted on the beachhead host by the IcedID malware — focusing on determining the system language and security products installed T Other familiar discovery techniques were then leveraged to establish situational awareness, such as network configurations and Windows domain configuration.
In this case, the existing control page language was collected using the following command:. As a test, entering this on a command prompt shows a numeric value. The Microsoft link shows the number of the language used — United States. It is highly likely that the threat actors were establishing the country of origin based on the language used — an extra fail-safe check to ensure certain users or regions were not targeted.
Once the threat actors had achieved lateral movement to domain controllers, the AdFind utility was employed to enumerate active directory objects T The recent Conti leaks indicate that Conti operators were surprised Ryuk operators were using their file.
The PowerView module Invoke-ShareFinder was executed from the beachhead host and a domain controller. Thanks for the explanation, Mark. I wouldn't drop our cloud services, as my Controls groups use Splashtop extensively. It's a little awkward combining internal remote support and customer facing remote support, that and the group memberships not allowing one user in multiple groups.
I'll go harass sales, I guess! Tell us something fun that you would like to do this summer and enter to win one of five Amazon gift cards. Easily purchase, deploy and manage Bitdefender endpoint security on your managed computers with Splashtop Remote Support. See how easy it is to purchase Bitdefender at a great price , deploy it on your endpoint computers with a couple clicks, and then view security status and run scans.
Start your free Remote Support trial here: www. Splashtop SOS is the fast, simple, and secure on-demand attended remote support solution for customer service, IT support, and help desk teams. Connect to your end users' computers right from within ServiceNow incidents by taking advantage of the integration between Splashtop SOS and ServiceNow. Start your free trial today here: www. Over 3, IT decision makers will attend to meet the teams from the top industry vendors, keep up with the latest trends in over 60 seminars and world-class keynotes, and network with their professional peers.
Visit the Splashtop Events page to learn more about all of our upcoming events this year. We hope to see you soon! If you haven't entered our Spiceworks-exclusive holiday contest yet, enter now to win one of five Amazon gift cards! Appreciate the interest in Splashtop.
Please simply email sales splashtop. Thank you again for your interest and support. I'm here to answer any question. If you're looking for an easy way to provide on-demand support from within Spiceworks Help Desk, here's a great way to do it. The integration with Spiceworks Help Desk gives you easy access to remote access and logging of session info so you can reduce resolution time and more easily provide support. Hello, I am doing a trial of Splashtop and am favorably impressed.
Previously on TeamViewer. My Splashtop trial shows as Business. My inclination is I need to be using Remote Support Plus since I need unattended access to several computers that I support. I think we are on the same page, I just need some clarifications.
Pricing pages confused me just a bit. I am assuming that is the deployable agent you are referring to. Will those installs need to be changed to something for Remote Support Plus instead of Business? Will my 12 digit code stay the same, or change, if I have to install something new? Correct, the SRS Plus pack computers include 25 unattended computer and also an ad-hoc 9-digit attended support license for unlimited devices.
Sorry about the confusion. Look like everything you have is correct You also have the correct client Windows app on the 4 host computers Is there a plan to allow us to access mapped network drives on remote computers from the file transfer window in Splashtop? This would be very useful. Splashtop Business Access - www. Access your computer from anywhere, just as if you're right in front of it! Splashtop Remote Support - www.
Includes both unattended and attended access. Splashtop On-Demand Support - www. No software installation needed. Connect with a simple 9-digit code. Splashtop has built a global relay infrastructure, based on Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure, to ensure high level of reliability and performance across networks.
Please visit www. Your content contains a http link. It's recommended that you use https instead. Are you sure you want to save? View the guideline here! Activity Feeds More. Ask Splashtop a question. Mar 22, at UTC on the Splashtop page. Our current remote usage details: Only one person accesses other computers remotely Up to 8 computers are accessed simultaneously more commonly 1 - 4 Remote sessions are initiated from 2 computers would like to do so from 3 50 - 60 different computers are accessed File transfer and chat are used Unattended access is used Based on this, it looks like we would require SOS Unlimited.
Am I correct? Spice 3. Spice 1. Spice 0. Spice 2. View 2 other comments.
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